The first 15 minutes#
Is an incident happening right now? Choose what you are seeing and get the steps for the first 15 minutes.
Ransomware or encrypted files
Do now, in this order
- Disconnect from the network the systems that are encrypting (cable, Wi-Fi or EDR isolation), but do not shut them down: the encryption key may still be in RAM.
- Stop the file shares and disable the accounts running the encryption.
- Check whether the backups are intact and disconnect them from the network.
- Photograph the ransom note and keep one encrypted file as a sample.
- Inform management over a channel outside the affected network and open the incident log.
- Start the reporting clock: the early warning is due within 24 hours.
Do not
- Do not shut down or reboot the affected systems.
- Do not restore over compromised systems before imaging them.
- Do not contact the attacker or pay without a management decision taken with legal counsel.
- Do not discuss the incident on the organization's email or chat.
Continue with
Compromised account or fraudulent email
Do now, in this order
- Revoke the account's sessions and tokens, then reset the password. A reset alone does not close sessions that are already open.
- Find and delete the inbox rules and forwarding set up by the attacker.
- Check the registered MFA methods and the OAuth applications that were granted consent.
- Export the audit logs (sign-in, Unified Audit Log) before they expire.
- Warn the recipients of the fraudulent messages. If a payment was made, call the bank immediately.
- Assess whether the attacker had access to personal data (GDPR deadline: 72 hours).
Do not
- Do not delete the account: you lose the logs and the evidence.
- Do not rely on a password change alone.
- Do not assume MFA protected you: stolen tokens bypass it.
Continue with
Email and M365 playbookIdentity: AD and cloudReporting deadlines
Compromised website or web server
Do now, in this order
- Copy the suspicious files and the access logs (with hashes) before any cleanup.
- Take the site out of production or put it behind a WAF or a maintenance page.
- Look for web shells and recently modified files.
- Change every secret in the configuration: database password, API keys, application keys.
- Check whether the attacker escaped the web account: processes, cron, network connections.
- Find in the access log the vulnerability used to get in.
Do not
- Do not restore from backup without closing the vulnerability: it will be compromised again.
- Do not delete logs or reinstall before preserving the evidence.
Continue with
Suspicious Windows workstation or server
Do now, in this order
- Do not shut the system down. Isolate it from the network only if impact is ongoing, preferably with EDR isolation.
- Capture RAM to external media.
- Collect the triage artifacts with KAPE.
- Run live triage: processes, connections, persistence.
- Note every account that logged on to the system: treat them as compromised.
- Record each step in the log and hash every piece of evidence.
Do not
- Do not log on to the suspect system with a Domain Admin account: you expose its credentials.
- Do not run a "cleanup" antivirus scan before collection.
- Do not save anything to the investigated disk.
Continue with
Suspicious Linux server
Do now, in this order
- Do not reboot the server.
- If it is a VPS or cloud instance, take a provider snapshot before changing anything.
- Capture memory with AVML.
- Run the automated collection with UAC.
- Check processes, network and persistence with static binaries from USB.
- Check
authorized_keys, cron and systemd units.
Do not
- Do not install packages on the investigated system.
- Do not delete the attacker's files before copying and hashing them.
- Do not trust
ps,lsorsson the system: they may have been replaced.
Continue with
I do not know yet
Do now, in this order
- Open the incident log and note the time in UTC.
- Write down what was observed, by whom and when.
- Preserve the evidence: do not shut down, reinstall or delete.
- Check whether impact is ongoing (encryption, exfiltration, abused accounts).
- Gather the context listed in the rapid briefing template.
- Escalate to the person who decides (Incident Manager).
Do not
- Do not assume it is a false alarm without checking.
- Do not make changes "to see if it goes away".